Coalition collapse: what's going on in Germany?

The way the moderate parties are handling the AfD and BSW reminds Göteborgs-Posten of the rise of the right-wing Sweden Democrats:

“The Germans find themselves where Sweden was ten years ago - trying in many ways to pretend that these protest parties are not even there. Ultimately, however, the established parties are being forced to govern in unholy alliances, which further undermines trust in them - while the populists grow ever stronger. The whole thing resembles a classic tragedy in which the hero involuntarily brings about his own downfall. Perhaps the penny has finally dropped after Trump's victory in the US.”

The left-wing Polish website Krytyka Polityczna has mixed feelings about the prospect of a change of government:

“For Poland, a Christian Democrat government would be good news, especially in combination with the Greens, as this party - unlike the SPD - has no particular sympathies for Russia. For the left in a broader sense, however, this is bad news. The dramatic collapse of the German three-party coalition that included two left-wing parties and the simultaneous rise of the AfD is further proof that the progressive forces in the West are incapable of coming up with convincing answers to the brown wave that is sweeping across Europe.”

Political scientist Linas Kojala predicts on LRT that plans to station a German brigade in Lithuania won't be changed under a new government:

“Friedrich Merz wants to become chancellor. The conservative lawyer, who worked in the business sector for many years, promises a more dynamic and courageous government. ... How this will affect Germany's strategic projects - including the deployment of a brigade in Lithuania - remains to be seen. There is a consensus between the major parties on this issue, so the project will probably go ahead even if there is a change of government. In any case, the Christian Democrats have promised not to make any concessions to the Russian aggressor.”

Germany's crisis is bad for Europe as a whole, L'Opinion comments:

“The traffic light coalition has been chaotic for three years now, and was already moribund on several occasions. ... Which goes to show that France is not alone in its political crisis. ... Faced with challenges to its economic model, as evidenced by the closure of VW plants, and the need to rethink its defence, Germany is in a bad way. Over the course of Europe's history this has never been good news. And especially now, when Emmanuel Macron is rightly calling for a 'strategic awakening' in Europe, as he did on Thursday in Budapest before the European heads of state and government. But who could believe that this is possible with a Germany that is conspicuously absent?”

After Trump's election victory and the events in Berlin, Jyllands-Posten discusses to whom countries like Denmark should look for orientation:

“As a small country, Denmark has always taken comfort in the fact that it is protected by the big powers. Or more precisely, it has navigated in the triangle formed by London, Berlin and Washington, sometimes with a small detour to Paris. ... Now Germany is in the doldrums. If the crisis leads to a general election, it is by no means certain that the politicians elected will approach their task with humility and the dogma that a good German is a good European. ... With the British out of the mix, the Germans out of action and the US unpredictable, whom should Denmark turn to?”

De Volkskrant sees the possibility of a grand coalition:

“The traffic light coalition is now lower in the polls than the opposition CDU on its own. ... But taken together, the CDU and the SPD add up to around 50 percent. And that's what the CDU is counting on: keeping the SPD small enough that it could be dominated in a new coalition, but not so small as to require a third party. This puts a return of the grand coalition - the two-party coalition that kept Germany stable for decades - on the table. For many Germans from the democratic centre, that is not bad news. But the CDU in 2024 is a very conservative party that leans towards the radical right on asylum issues. Meaning that a shift to the right is in the air for the last progressive superpower in Europe.”

Germans also have little confidence in the opposition, emphasises the Tages-Anzeiger:

“It's unlikely that the next government will have an easier time than the traffic light coalition with the tasks that are pending. Given the current balance of power in the parliament, it will once again have to form a coalition of two or more parties across the political centre - with all the ideological contradictions that entails. There is currently an enormous level of distrust among Germans. Friedrich Merz's Christian Democrats, for example, who according to polls currently have more popular support than the SPD, Greens and FDP combined, are not even trusted by one in four to govern any better than the detested traffic light coalition.”

The end of the traffic light coalition is good news for the EU, writes the Süddeutsche Zeitung:

“In Brussels votes, the German abstention, due to disagreement between the FDP and the Greens, has become a trademark: 'German Vote' - because they do not know what they are doing. ... If we assume that the Christian Democrats will nominate the next chancellor, completely new organisational possibilities will soon open up in the interaction between Berlin and Brussels. The President of the EU Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, comes from the CDU. The most powerful man in the European Parliament, Manfred Weber, comes from the [CDU's sister party] CSU. Europe's Christian democratic-conservative party family makes up half of the new Commission and leads half of the national governments in the EU. It is now primarily their responsibility to prevent an era of Trumpists in Europe.”

Aktuality.sk fears a strong polarisation of German society after snap elections:

“If the CDU/CSU has to choose partners for a future governing coalition, it won't find common ground with the SPD or the Greens, but with the AfD. Together they would easily secure over 50 percent of the vote. This would in turn provoke resistance from the left and from the extremists of the alliance of former communist Sahra Wagenknecht. ... The battle between neo-fascists and communists really doesn't bode well for Europe's strongest economy. After the fears of a potential threat to democracy in the US, the EU's most powerful country is facing a similar development. It's going to be a wild ride, hold on to your seats!”

In a commentary for Delfi, journalist Māris Zanders takes a look at the chances of extremist parties in the elections:

“Sahra Wagenknecht [leader of the BSW] has been accused of pro-Kremlinism, and in this respect she is truly dangerous, although she knows how to present this position in an attractive way. ... It seems to me that the Western political elites are failing to grasp that more and more voters are calling for both radical change (down with the elites!) and the preservation of the status quo (no 'inclusive societies' or other 'liberal' nonsense!). Is such a mishmash harmful? If it's only one of the courses on the menu, there's no need to panic. But if it replaces the starter, soup and dessert, it could cause digestive problems.”

The Spectator worries:

“What comes next remains far from clear. With the discussions on the budget breaking down and the FDP out of the coalition, Scholz has no parliamentary majority with which to pass a new economic programme. As such, Germany has no agreed economic direction for next year. While this is most likely to be a problem for whichever administration comes in next, in the interim period, Germany will be entering 2025's choppy waters economically unmoored.”

It would be unfair to pin all the blame on Lindner, Zeit Online emphasises:

“Scholz's traffic light coalition was so acrimonious and full of contradictions that many voters would have liked to see more leadership from the head of government. But Scholz rarely satisfied this requirement. And when he did speak up, what he said was so technocratic and complicated that it didn't really get through to people. In this way, Scholz himself created the vacuum that Lindner and other disgruntled coalition politicians took undue advantage of. Senior members of the Greens have also openly blamed Scholz's leadership style for the collapse of the traffic light coalition.”

Although the timing was poor, ending the coalition is probably the lesser evil, writes the taz:

“The idea of the German chancellor having to run around the country's marketplaces trying to convince a few pensioners of the merits of social democracy while Trump is changing the world order with unforeseeable consequences for the entire West and for Ukraine, Israel and Palestine is absurd. But does that make the move towards snap elections wrong? True, the timing is awkward, and stability can sometimes be a value in itself. But a continuation of the traffic light coalition would have been even worse. After all, one takeaway from Trump's election victory is that centre parties that continue to muddle through don't stand a chance against right-wing populism in the long term.”