Kursk offensive: what will the consequences be?

According to the Tages-Anzeiger, the Kursk offensive reveals the futility of continuing the war:

“In the same way that the leadership in Kyiv may be pinning exaggerated hopes on the Kursk advance, Putin is interpreting minimal territorial gains in Chasiv Yar, for example, as an imminent breakthrough and proof of Russian superiority. But no one is superior in this war. It's all about perseverance and the ability to suffer. The leadership in Kyiv is well aware of this and is cautiously signalling its willingness to end this pointless exercise. Even the incursion into Kursk can be seen as an appeal: See, you are vulnerable - there will be no victor here.”

Commenting in Echo, exiled politician Maxim Katz sees the Ukrainians' territorial gains as leverage for upcoming peace talks:

“Negotiations are still a long way off, but one day they will come. And entering them with control over part of the Kursk region gives Ukraine a very strong position. Even a few hundred square kilometres of internationally recognised Russian territory is worth more in negotiations than anything Putin has been able to conquer and claim by constitution. ... As long as the Ukrainian side doesn't make any seriously stupid mistakes, allow flank attacks or disregard military rules, in its current state Russia's army will need at least a year, with heavy losses, to get its border back to where it was before.”

Moscow did not see the Ukrainian attack coming, security expert Erkki Koort concludes in Postimees:

“Clearly Russia either did not know about the invasion, or it failed to react appropriately. If you look at the Russian president's meetings with the heads of the security services and the governors, you can see just how much confusion there was. One can only guess what's going on in the room when the talks are not broadcast publicly. ... Almost 200,000 people are on the move, and information is spreading. This could lead to spontaneous demonstrations and unrest. The National Guard, together with the FSB, must prepare to prevent or disperse them.”

So far the Russians have not deployed any troops in the direction of Kursk, notes Gazeta Wyborcza:

“If the goal was to force the Russians to move units from the sections of the front where over the last few months they have been conducting a slow but successful offensive to the area around Kursk, this has not been successful. In the Donbass, where the situation is most difficult for the Ukrainian troops, the number of attacks has decreased (by 30 percent according to Ukrainian expert Oleg Zhdanov, who publishes detailed daily reports from the front), but the Russians are still steadily advancing, for example near Pokrovsk or in Chasiv Yar.”

Julia Latynina explains in Echo why the Russian army is so immobile:

“The incursion into the Kursk region is a brilliant tactical success for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They have achieved many of their goals. ... But to say that 'it's been a week and still Putin hasn't been able to do a thing about it' is the wrong approach in my opinion. ... It's very possible that the Russian army didn't react immediately simply because it couldn't. A dinosaur can't do a quick U-turn. It does things differently.”

Ukraine's advance is risky to say the least, commentator Maxim Yusin writes in Kommersant:

“Western military analysts are suggesting that the situation should not be viewed in the context of emotions, hype and PR, but globally. In this case it is clear that Kyiv has taken a very risky step. ... By definition, Ukrainian forces cannot penetrate deep into Russian territory: sooner or later the front will stabilise. And from that moment on, Moscow, which has far more human resources and far greater firepower, will start to benefit from the situation.”

Ukrainian successes in the Kursk region are undermining Putin's confidence in his own army, NV concludes:

“Vladimir Putin no longer trusts either the Russian General Staff or the Ministry of Defence. ... He made it abundantly clear that the military had fallen out of favour when he announced a so-called counter-terrorist operation in the Kursk region and the neighbouring regions of Bryansk and Belgorod. What does that mean? That control of the troops is being transferred, so to speak, from the army, from the military, to the Russian intelligence service, the FSB. Why the FSB? Because Vladimir Putin himself hails from this structure. FSB officers are the only representatives of the security forces that he trusts almost completely.”

Now the tables are turning, journalist Paul Lendvai writes in Der Standard:

“Western observers rightly condemn the complaints by Putin and his huge media apparatus about Ukrainian 'provocateurs' and 'terrorists' as cynical hypocrisy. ... What the civilians living in the Kursk region are now experiencing has been the sad everyday reality for the people of Kyiv, Kharkiv and Lviv since February 2022. Millions of refugees, destroyed power plants and cities with thousands of victims across Ukraine are the consequence of the megalomania of the Russian nationalists who want to wipe out the Ukrainian state.”

Columnist Murat Sururi Özbülbül speculates in Yeniçağ that Putin's days in power could be numbered:

“I believe that the Russian army is no longer obeying Putin and is preparing for an uprising. If this is true and it comes to such a confrontation, Putin will not only lose the areas he has occupied, he will also lose power and thus his life in the near future. For the rest of the world it's clearly crucial whether this would lead to war or not - and whether a new government in Russia would follow the same path as Putin. Putin's fall and above all the democratisation of Russia would radically change the balance of power in the world - and especially in the Middle East.”

Gazeta Wyborcza expects a brutal response:

“Moscow is undoubtedly preparing its typical reaction to military defeats, namely to fire indiscriminately at Ukrainian territory, including civilian targets, with everything it has at its disposal. ... Putin won't hesitate this time either. He needs to save face after this embarrassment. As the opposition member Leonid Gozman rightly remarked, 'a tsar who can't defend his territory cannot remain tsar'.”

After months of negative news, Õhtuleht is delighted with the new turn of events:

“Suddenly, the Ukrainians have succeeded where no one had expected them to, namely in taking the war to the aggressor's side. ... The boldness and vigour with which the Ukrainians continue their struggle (at least at the time of writing on Monday evening) sends a long-awaited and much-needed message to all those who carry the blue and yellow flag in their hearts. And it was needed in more ways than one. Firstly, unmistakable war-weariness was already spreading among the Western allies. .... And Ukraine itself also urgently needs a boost in motivation!”

The offensive shows that Ukraine knows how to make the most of the military aid it is receiving, says the Financial Times:

“Ukraine has learned, too, that success on the battlefield is the best way to persuade its international allies to step up supplies of military aid and equipment. By executing what appears to be a highly mobile attack utilising western-supplied armoured vehicles and air defences, Kyiv sends a message to western capitals that such support is not in vain. And, while there are big questions over whether it has the manpower and equipment to maintain its gains long-term, holding some Russian territory could strengthen its hand in any negotiations with Moscow.”

Politiken is pleased with the offensive but also draws a lesson from it :

“At the same time, the operation also highlights how wars have their own logic, and that it is not really possible for the West to control the use of the weapons we sell and donate from afar. ... It is important to emphasise that when the West sends weapons to warring countries like Ukraine and Israel, we cannot control their use in detail in the real world. We should take note of this - even if we are now keeping our fingers crossed that Ukraine's success in the fight for freedom continues.”

The advance has already paid off, Telegraf explains:

“If this operation is successful, it will go down in military textbooks as an example of how to deter and even defeat an enemy who is more powerful in every way. But no one can guarantee that it will end successfully. ... Nevertheless, the risk had to be taken, because otherwise we would have protracted, defensive trench warfare with a predictably disappointing outcome for us. Even if the final plan does not completely coincide with the results on the ground, in these three days we have destroyed more enemy logistics than in the previous six months and shown that we can act quickly, creatively and dangerously.”

The move opens up new room for manoeuvre for Ukraine, writes RFI România:

“If Ukraine is able to maintain control of the gas distribution station in Sudzha, this would deprive Russia of a significant portion of the revenue it is using to finance the war. Furthermore, Ukrainian control of part of Russia's territory would also jeopardise Russia's claim to be militarily superior in any peace talks. From this point of view, the offensive considerably strengthens Ukraine's negotiating position. Provided Ukraine can keep it going.”

Savon Sanomat hopes that the West will back the operation:

“Despite its success so far, the Ukrainian operation poses major risks. Not only will there be a fierce Russian counterattack and retaliation, it's also unclear what the West thinks about it. ... Many countries are taking the stance that the supplied weapons can only be used for defence on Ukrainian territory. The US has already made it clear that Ukraine's actions in Kursk do not violate the restrictions on the use of American weapons. Other countries should follow suit. Ukraine's hands must not be tied when the enemy attacks it without restraint.”

Rzeczpospolita observes:

“The Ukrainian offensive has also brought victory on a completely different, less obvious front. It is telling that the Western states didn't initially comment on these events. They were probably observing the progress of the Ukrainian armed forces but also waiting for Moscow's reaction. It was only after Putin ended the Security Council meeting without declaring a general mobilisation or martial law that the first comments appeared, including from the US and Germany.”

Retired colonel Hannes Toomsalu explains in Postimees:

“It is certainly not the Ukrainians' objective to occupy and capture the old Cossack settlement area. The goal is to force the Russians to bring units from the eastern front to the north. But it's also about creating discontent among Russian citizens and undermining Putin's government.”

Naftemporiki analyses:

“The Russians are not in danger militarily, their only problem is to preserve their image. On the other hand, Ukrainian President Zelensky, who is facing great difficulties both politically and on the battlefield, has gone on the offensive to show public opinion and his supporters that Ukraine still has the potential to cause the Russians problems. And there is another way of looking at it. With Iran poised to attack Israel, Ukraine could fall out of the international public eye. And Zelensky wanted to remain the focus of the West's attention in this war in Ukraine.”

This offensive could backfire, Handelsblatt fears:

“On the one hand, the advance widens the front, which can hardly be held anyway. It also ties up Russian forces, at least temporarily. But the Ukrainian soldiers who are now fighting in Russia are absent from sections of the front that threaten to become porous. ... However, the advance is also risky for a second reason. The West has authorised the use of weapons it has supplied against military targets in the Russian border region. But should German Leopard tanks fall into the hands of the Russians during the attack, Vladimir Putin would happily use them as evidence for his narrative that Nato is actually waging war against Russia.”

The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk above all highlights the weakness of the Russian aggressor, Spotmedia concludes:

“In a war in which Putin had calculated that it would take no more than two weeks to topple the regime in Kyiv, two and a half years later the Ukrainians are still holding out and are now conducting a military offensive in Russia. That says everything about the Kremlin leader's strategic errors.”

Political scientist Volodymyr Fessenko explains the Kremlin's restrained response in NV:

“Putin described this as a 'large-scale Ukrainian provocation', but did not officially declare war on Ukraine, although he was called upon to do so on Russian social networks and Telegram channels. Moreover, there is no talk of using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine. ... Clearly Putin does not want to further fuel the current war or increase its intensity and severity. Because that could lead to uncontrollable negative consequences both for Russia's future relations with the West and for the development of the domestic political situation.”

In a Facebook post, Vladislav Inosemtsev reflects on the perilous implications for Russia:

“The incursion of units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine into the Kursk region faces the country's leadership with a very difficult choice regarding how to assess the latest events and respond to them. ... They could be labelled a declaration of war on Russia, but that is dangerous. ... If this is admitted, martial law will have to be declared in the country and it may come to a general mobilisation. That in turn could lead to the use of tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, and ultimately to a request for assistance to the member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.”

Journalist Yulia Latynina analyses the strategy behind the move in Echo:

“As far as the Kursk nuclear power plant is concerned, it's hard to say for sure, but the obvious target has already been brought under control: the Sudzha gas measuring station, which is of enormous importance to Putin because gas flows to Europe through it. ... Given the meagre Russian reserves, Putin will probably be forced to quickly withdraw troops from the Donbass, where holding the front is difficult, and move them to the Kursk region instead. That's what all this was done for.”

La Stampa takes stock:

“In view of the complicated situation of the Ukrainians on the eastern front of Donetsk on the one hand, and the debate over the use of Western weapons in Russia on the other, which, although redundant among all key Nato allies (with the exception of Italy, which continues to oppose the use of Western weapons on Russian territory), could be reignited to Kyiv's disadvantage, the Ukrainian action might seem rash, or even foolish. ... It could turn out to be either a gigantic flop or a brilliant manoeuvre that rebalances the political, military and, who knows, perhaps even diplomatic dynamics.”

The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung finds it simply grotesque that Putin is now ranting about a "large-scale provocation" by Ukraine:

“What is going on in the Kursk region is dreadful for the civilian population living there. However, the responsibility for this lies entirely with the man in charge in the Kremlin. If he had not invaded Ukraine, the Russians in the villages on the south-west border could continue to lead a quiet and peaceful life. From the beginning of his rule, Putin has opted for violence: against Chechens, Georgians, Syrians and Ukrainians. Now this violence is coming back to the Russians.”

Political scientist Abbas Galliamov is amused that Putin is calling this a provocation, and comments on Facebook:

“Why a 'provocation'? There is a war going on, in the course of which a military operation has been carried out. That's a standard narrative, isn't it? It's bad that people are dying, but why call it a 'provocation'? Because you didn't expect it? You didn't expect the enemy to show initiative? ... Didn't they teach you that in your academies? Well, if that's the case, then yes, this is indeed a 'provocation'.”