Russia exits grain deal - this time for good?

News.bg believes that Russia is positioning itself to demand more concessions:

“It is quite possible that the Russians are planning a major blackmail attempt. The West's willingness to give in to the Russian Agricultural Bank [regarding its reintegration into the Swift payment system] may have been perceived as a weakness by the Kremlin. And where there are weaknesses, pressure can be exerted. This is Russia's idea of foreign policy.”

Countries in Africa will suffer most from the effects of rising grain prices, Turun Sanomat stresses:

“Russia's withdrawal from the agreement poses a significant long-term threat to the grain market. The rising prices will hit the most disadvantaged countries and people the hardest. Russia is using grain as an instrument for blackmail and doesn't care about the consequences of its actions. Russia is taking a big risk, because higher food prices will mainly affect countries that are sympathetic towards it, for example those in Africa. And Russia already doesn't have many friends left.”

Russia's decision does not have to mean the end of the grain deal, the Ukraine correspondent of the taz, Bernhard Clasen, makes clear:

“If Russia does not want to participate, then certain countries and the UN should step in to represent the international community and export grain directly from Ukraine. Russia will not shoot at these grain ships. Especially not if they are flying the flags of a state that is not an enemy of Russia, such as Egypt, China, South Africa or Brazil. ... At the same time countries such as Brazil, South Africa and China must be supported in financing the high costs of insuring these grain ships. If there is money for weapons, there must also be money for insuring ships carrying grain.”

Pulling out of the grain deal is not in Russia's interest, says Yevgeniya Gaber, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, in NV:

“Russia may say that continuing the agreement in the trilateral format crosses a 'red line'. But an attack by Russian forces on a ship loaded with grain could trigger a serious reaction that Moscow does not want, depending on which country the ship belongs to, who owns it and where the sailors are from. I would not be surprised if Russia resumes the grain deal in the next few weeks after a meeting or phone call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.”

Ukraine should demand the continued export of its agricultural goods via the Black Sea even without an extension of the grain agreement, writes Tageblatt:

“For why should Kyiv have to be dependent on the benevolence of its aggressor if it wants to exercise its internationally guaranteed rights and trade via international waters? The Black Sea is not a Russian Mare Nostrum. ... Around eight million out of a total of 33 million tonnes were shipped to China. The Kremlin boss may receive a call from Beijing very soon. The government would do well not to give in to Putin's blackmail.”

The suspended grain deal is likely to have devastating repercussions, The Irish Times warns:

“Ukraine's plan B, involving a €500 million guarantee fund for ships using the Black Sea, and a diversion of grain through the Danube river, is unlikely to come close to compensating for the loss of a route that is now seeing a monthly 4.2 million metric tons pass through it, over 80 per cent of pre-war exports. A resumption of Russia's threat to shipping - it started yesterday with a wave of drone and cruise attacks on the port of Odessa - strikes directly at a vital civilian target crucial to feeding some of the world's poorest nations. It is nothing short of a war crime.”

The West's claim that Russia is endangering the lives of the most vulnerable is simply not true, writes Sašo Ornik on his blog Jinov Svet:

“The problem is that few people in the Global South will believe them. It's clear to all that no one in the West cares about their needs, and that Ukrainian grain actually served to up the profits of Western companies. And on the other hand the importance of Ukrainian grain is exaggerated. World grain production is 2,300 million tonnes per year. The agreement on the export of Ukrainian grain accounts for only 33 million tonnes, of which 18 million went to Western countries.”

La Stampa hopes for a compromise solution:

“Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Moscow was ready to reactivate the agreement as soon as Russian 'conditions' were met. It is not entirely clear what these are. One important condition is certainly the re-admission of the Russian Agricultural Bank to the Swift system. The compromise offered by UN Secretary-General António Guterres involving the readmission of one of the bank's subsidiaries was not sufficient. ... The markets probably assume that a solution will be found. This is one of the reasons why they reacted without much drama.”

Not all the blame can be pinned on Russia, Der Standard comments:

“There are two sides to the deal. Free passage of grain ships from the Black Sea ports is one. The other is that the deal should also allow Russia to export agricultural products. But sanctions against banks, for example, make exports more difficult. Russia's demand: the Russian Agricultural Bank should be exempted from the West's sanctions so as to be able to do business. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called the grain agreement a 'beacon of hope'. It must not go out. Russia must move forward. But the West must also lift sanctions, at least when it comes to food supplies.”

Putin is trying to pressure the West with the grain agreement, La Croix observes:

“The agreement contributes to Moscow's propaganda that it is the West's sanctions that are blocking exports. It is also a means for Putin to win over new partners in Africa and to make his signature at each renegotiation conditional on an ever-growing list of demands, some of which have nothing to do with the actual subject of the agreement. Since antiquity it has been known that whoever wields wheat wields diplomatic power. Moscow is now turning it into a weapon of war - handmade by Vladimir Putin's cynicism.”

Putin could also be aiming to put Europe's solidarity with Ukraine to the test, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung puts in:

“With the exports of Ukrainian agricultural products by land this spring, European farmers found themselves facing new and very undesirable competition, and Moscow was very aware of the rifts this caused in the EU. If Ukrainian grain can no longer be exported across the Black Sea, its only path to international markets will be via the EU. And despite farmers' protests the EU can hardly seal itself off, because if it does it would smother one of Ukraine's key economic sectors.”

There's no need to worry, says Polityka:

“The cancellation of the grain deal is bad news, the effects of which will also be felt in Poland. But the situation is not comparable with the first months of the war, the blockade of the Black Sea and the chaos which stoked fears of a global crisis with malnutrition and famine and fuelled inflation in food prices. ... Perhaps the agreement was necessary to buy Ukraine time to adapt as best it could to the new circumstances. The rest of the world is now also prepared. After this year's harvest, global corn reserves - from Brazil, among other countries - are likely to be at their highest level in five years, whereas just before the war they were extremely low.”